- deals with the last stage of the Vietnam War, 1972-1975, after the departure of all American troops, when the war had been reduced to a local struggle between the regular armies of North and South Vietnam. Initially these were fairly equally matched. Military and other Aid to each opponent from outside patrons however proved decisive to the outcome of the war. While American Aid to the South, statistically speaking, seemed to be falling of a cliff, as US Congress had lost all interest in supporting their allies, Soviet and Chinese Aid, in keen competition with each other, kept pumping up the North Vietnamese army.

The avoidable defeat of South Vietnam and the consequent disappearance of the democratic legacy did not spell the end of suffering. New terrible wars ensued with Cambodia, Laos and China. And even today, the remnants of communist doctrine hang like a wet blanket over the political and economic development of the unified country.

Against this wide canvas, the essential decision making in civilian and military and personal spheres (all intertwined) is vividly portrayed by an insider of the Saigon Government/military/diplomatic circuit. As president of Shell Vietnam, the author was responsible for 50% of fuel supplies to the country. Oil, as an essential and untraceable commodity, served as paymaster to underpaid army and, via black market dollars, also as fuel for the communists.

In all third world conflicts, similar problems confront foreign sponsors/participants: the superiority of local troops on home ground over expensive Western ground forces, the need to maintain economic support and strategic focus under the glare of international media and public opinion. The Vietnam experience remains valid as ever.