Iraq war: the end game

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Time has come to bring the American “war on terror” to an end. It successfully knocked out two odious regimes, those of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, and contributed to a worldwide strengthening of anti terrorist defences, but it could never even come close to defeating terrorism itself. That is because terrorism is a normal transitional state for any “sacred cause” to gain recognition and popular support, allowing the terrorists to mutate into freedom fighters and, with luck, to flower as responsible statesmen thereafter. The Israeli state owes its existence largely to terror, so does Vietnam. Many respected statesmen of Northern Ireland, of the Basque region in Spain and of South Africa have a background in terror. So please let us not lump all forms of terrorism together under absolute evil.

The time honoured and practical way to deal with terrorism, wherever it arises, is through hard diplomacy, creating alliances and addressing the root causes, strong arm police action and yes, limited military intervention as a last resort. But a prolonged foreign war, as the Iraq war has now become, is always a testimony to failure. It destroys what it seeks to save; it proliferates unacceptable practices and institutions like Guantanamo Bay and muzzles free debate at home. It strongly reminds me of my own experience in war-torn South Vietnam.

In Iraq the issue never was, nor is, terrorism anyway. The El Qaida offshoot of El Zarqawi does play a minor role in the civil war, but its excesses are rapidly turning public opinion against it. After three years of war the major issue still to be resolved before the coalition troops can be withdrawn is the future form or the break-up of the state of Iraq itself. From its creation by the Treaty of Sevres, signed by some 20 nations in 1920, when “Mesopotamia” as Iraq was then called, was split off from the Ottoman empire and handed as a mandate to the British Empire (as Syria and Lebanon were to France), it has proved inherently unstable. The 28 million Kurds in the region who were clamouring for a separate nation - an independent Kurdistan is recommended in the text of the treaty - were instead parcelled out to Turkey (where they form 20 % of the total population), to Iraq (15 to 20%), To Syria (9%), and to Iran (7%). In each of these nations they form, to put it mildly, an unruly and suppressed minority. But Iraq is exceptionally unruly for other reasons too. When the British put a Hashemite monarch in charge of independent Iraq, governing through Sunni officials and Sunni officers over the Shias, who form 60 % of the total population, they added yet another element of instability and strife. After the murder of the king, the Sunni republican leaders could only hold the country together by brute force of arms, ruling through the army. Saddam was only the last brutal dictator to hold power when the music stopped.

The quick defeat of the Iraqi army in 2003 presented the US occupation authority with a window of opportunity to pursue either of two political options with regard to the future governance of Iraq, assuming of course that a third, the continuation of eighty years of “undemocratic” Sunni predominance over a strongly centralised Iraq, was made impossible by the fall of Saddam.

The first radical option was the break-up of Iraq into two or three independent parts. In this scenario the Kurds could have been granted full independence in their own nation in the northern part of the country. At the time of the treaty of Sevres this was widely considered desirable in principle, but, in 1920, before oil, Kurdistan would have been a pauper nation, hardly viable in practice. Now, however, its oil wealth and international recognition would have turned it into a major regional player. Of course it would have created turmoil amongst suppressed Kurds in Turkey and Iran who would inevitably try to join an independent Kurdistan and this would rightly be seen as a threat to the unity of these arrogant nations. But it might not be such a bad thing for power in the region to be divided more evenly. Allowing a people united by a common language and culture the final choice over their destiny, might even spread democracy in the region.  As a consequence of the split-up, the Shias of Iraq would find themselves in undisputed control of the Southern rump of ex-Iraq with the other half of its oil potential. As Arabs, not wanting to become part of Farsi Iran, where the Arab minority is suppressed, they would be in control of their own rich resources. Not a bad thing either, to fragment control over the world’s second largest oil reserves. The Sunnis, the losers in the split-up, would remain as a minority under Shia rule, with Baghdad as a shared capital. Repercussions would be felt as far as Bahrain, Syria and Saudi Arabia where large Shia populations are still traditionally governed by Sunni governments without democratic pretences. Alternatively the Sunnis could secede, attaching themselves to Syria, Jordan or Saudi Arabia.

2. The easier second, but not necessarily better, option of a loose federal but united Iraq, seems to have been blundered into without much forethought. Almost as a knee-jerk reaction to quick military victory, the Iraqi army was disbanded by the occupying forces instead of reformed. The Baath party, which governed Iraq since 1968 and embodies modern pan-Arab ideas on secular government, as opposed to fundamentalist Islamic government, was simply banned. It would have been infinitely better - and possible - to clean the army and the Baath party from its Saddam influences and through them maintain control of the country. Instead, as a direct result of these two blunders, Iraq erupted like a volcano. The Kurds, laying aside their fratricidal differences between PUK and KDP had to be given de facto independence, in return for keeping order in the north through their own militias. The Shias under grand ayatollah Sistani kept reasonably quiet in the secure knowledge that any American-inspired move towards democracy would automatically bring them to power. And indeed, in the January and December elections of 2005, Iraqis, voting according to tribe and religion, gave the Shias 130 seats in the 275 member parliament. Secular and progressive politicians, in spite of US support, got less than 10% of the vote. Meanwhile the Sunnis, who staged a remarkably effective armed revolt, are assiduously courted by US ambassador Khalilzad with promises of more influence than their numbers suggest, if only they would return to the fold.

Following the above spontaneous haphazard developments on the ground, the second option was duly codified in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Iraq and ratified by popular referendum in October 2005. It is of necessity a vague document, a dog’s breakfast of grandiose principles, outlining a multi-ethnic federal republic with 18 self governing provinces, two official languages (Arab and Kurdish) and 2 other local languages. Oil revenue is to be distributed amongst the regions “fairly”. Kurdish and Shia militias continue to exist beside or within the federal army. But already Kurds and Shias bitterly dispute essential details like majority decision versus veto power by regions, while inter-community and ethnic wars escalate. The US army stands ineffectively by. Clearly heads need to be knocked together, but how?

In my opinion, the necessary pressure for peace between the Iraqi factions can best be generated by old-fashioned diplomacy, getting the neighbours to endorse the new constitution and guarantee the territorial integrity of the new Iraq, backed up by the threat of sending a peacekeeping force to replace the US contingent if civil war persists. Such a regional peace effort has already been suggested by the king of Jordan. Unfortunately the US State Department does not seem to carry the same heavy stick at home as the Pentagon regarding “axis of evil” territory. Warlike speech-making still prevails in Washington. Khaliljad is only allowed limited contact with Iran at his level. Undoubtedly there is also some talk about cooperation between Turkish and US generals, but that is not the same as a Regional Peace Treaty, initiated by Secretary of State Rice or the UN, between nations bordering on Iraq, and which could be enforced by blue-helmeted peacekeepers.

In fact, the neighbouring states are as anxious as the US for Iraq to be stabilised and coalition forces withdrawn. For the poker game of negotiations the US holds a fairly good hand of cards:
Turkey, with its peculiar military/democratic government fears that a renewed revolt by its Kurdish minority, and their subsequent suppression, would end all hope of entering the European Union. Only US influence with the Kurds can help them to prevent this.
Iran, for all its hard-line fundamentalist bluster, is a weak, divided nation with only 50% of its population Farsi or Persian. After the terrible war with Saddam in the 1980s, it harshly suppressed revolutions by Kurdish and Arab communities bordering Iraq. Baluchi rebels are operating and taking hostages in the S.E. corner of the country on the Afghanistan border. As a beleaguered Shia nation, it would no doubt be relieved to support any Iraq contained within its present borders under a Shia- dominated government, which the US is delivering.
Syria’s minority Alawite government of president Bashar Al Asad, weakened by low economic growth, declining oil production, internal troubles and a restless Kurdish population, is in no condition to refuse anything proposed by the US and its neighbours. It would gladly endorse a stable Iraq, provided the Sunnis are taken care of.
Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait together share a vast desert space with Iraq through which Arab tribes migrate regardless of borders. As natural allies of their Sunni brethren in Iraq they would insist, as a constitutional minimum, that all Iraq’s oil revenues would be shared pro rata between Sunni, Shia and Kurds and that Sunnis retain significant ministries in the government. These points require amendments of the constitution.

If it plays its cards right, the withdrawal of coalition forces seems within reach even for a laidback State Department. Presented with a common front, a signed treaty and the threat of a regional peacekeeping force, the Iraqi warring fractions might come to their senses. It is the surest way to knock their heads together.

Louis Wesseling
March 2006.